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Admiralty

by John P. Kavanagh, Jr.*
The cases discussed herein represent decisions the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit issued in 2014 and 2015.
While not an all-inclusive list of maritime decisions from the court
during that timeframe, the Author identified and provided summaries
of key decisions which should be of interest to the maritime practitioner.'
I.

A.

CRUISE LINE PASSENGER CLAIMS

Medical Negligence

In Franza v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd.,2 the Eleventh Circuit-specifically rejecting longstanding jurisprudence from its sister
circuit-held a cruise ship passenger can sue a shipowner for medical
negligence under the doctrine of respondeat superior and the principles
of apparent authority and apparent agency.3

* Partner in the firm of Burr & Forman LLP. Co-Chair of the Firm's Transportation
and Maritime Practice Group. University of South Alabama (B.A., summa cum, laude,
1989); Tulane University School of Law (J.D., magna cum laude, 1992). Member, Maritime
Law Association of the United States, Southeastern Admiralty Law Institute, Propeller
Club (Port of Mobile). Member, State Bars of Mississippi and Alabama.
1. Many of the decisions were not identified by the court for publication. However, the
West National Reporter System "publishes" these non-published opinions in the Federal
Appendix. Pursuant to Rule 32.1 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, citation to
an unpublished opinion is allowed. FED. R. APp. P. 32.1. Further, Eleventh Circuit Rule
36-2 notes that, while not binding precedent, unpublished opinions "may be cited as
persuasive authority." 11th CIR. R. 36-2.
2. 772 F.3d 1225 (11th Cir. 2014).
3. Id. at 1228. The Eleventh Circuit declined to adopt the rule set out in Barbetta v.
S/S Bermuda Star, 848 F.2d 1364 (5th Cir. 1988), which effectively "immunize[dl a
shipowner from respondeat superior liability whenever a ship's employees render negligent
medical care to its passengers." Franza, 772 F.3d at 1228.
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Pasquale Vaglio was a passenger aboard the Royal Caribbean cruise
ship EXPLORER OF THE SEAS. On July 23, 2011, while attempting
to board a trolley at a port call4 in Bermuda, Vaglio fell and suffered a
severe head injury.5 The court pointed out that the complaint alleged
Vaglio "was required to go to the ship's medical center to be seen for his
injuries."' It does not explain why this was the case, but it is important
to note the posture of the matter on appeal. The suit was dismissed
pursuant to a motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)'
filed by the defendant cruise line.8 Thus, the appellate court was
compelled to "accept the well-pled allegations in the complaint and
construe them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff."' Accordingly,
the factual recitation in the appellate decision is straight from the
plaintiff's complaint, which obviously presents a one-sided version of the
underlying narrative.
Following his fall and presentation at the ship's infirmary, Vaglio
received a cursory exam from a nurse, "allegedly employed full-time by
Royal Caribbean."'0 Observing the knot and abrasion on Vaglio's head,
the nurse nevertheless conducted no diagnostic tests and advised Vaglio
and his family to return to their cabin. However, Vaglio's condition
deteriorated. He returned to the ship's infirmary but faced another
delay, as the medical providers would not examine him until the ship's
personnel obtained Vaglio's credit card information."' Vaglio was finally
seen by Dr. Rogelio Gonzales ("allegedly an employee of Royal Caribbean") some four hours after first coming to the infirmary.12 The dire
nature of Vaglio's condition must have been apparent to Dr. Gonzales,
as he ordered Vaglio be transferred to a shoreside hospital in Bermuda.
Vaglio was eventually airlifted to a hospital in New York, but sadly died
approximately one week after his fall in Bermuda.
Patricia Franza, Pasquale Vaglio's daughter, filed suit against the
cruise line in the United States District Court for the Southern District
of Florida. Franza advanced a trio of liability theories in her original
complaint: (1) Negligence and/or misconduct for which Royal Caribbean

4.

"A port at which a ship stops during a voyage." See Port of Call, BLACK'S LAW

DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).

5. Franza, 772 F.3d at 1228.
6. Id. at 1229.
7. FED. R. CIv. P. 12(b)(6).
8. Franza, 772 F.3d at 1228.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 1229.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
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was liable under the doctrine of actual agency (respondeat superior), (2)
the alternative theory of apparent agency, by which Royal Caribbean led
Vaglio to believe the doctor or nurse were the company's employees or
agents, and (3) a theory of negligent hiring, retention, and training." In
granting Royal Caribbean's motion to dismiss, the court made short work
of the actual agency/respondeat superior claim: "[Tihe district court
applied the Barbetta rule to conclude that Franza's actual agency claim
was 'predicated on duties of care which are not recognized under
The district court dismissed Franza's claims involvmaritime law."'
ing apparent agency as inadequately pled, holding Ms. Franza had not
"plausibly claimed that Vaglio ever relied on the appearance of an
agency relationship."
In beginning its legal analysis, the Eleventh Circuit first stated,
"Neither the Supreme Court nor this Court has ever decided, in binding
precedent, whether a passenger may hold a shipowner vicariously liable
The court
for the medical negligence of the ship's employees.""
continued by observing that federal courts are constitutionally charged
with developing fair and equitable principles to address maritime
claims." Following this vein of reasoning, it was observed that the
Supreme Court-in other contexts under the general maritime law-has
imposed vicarious liability upon "maritime principals to answer for the
negligence of their onboard agents.""
The court then discussed the factors which can demonstrate actual
20
agency, the underpinning of the respondeat superior doctrine. Recall
the allegation that the treating nurse and physician were employees of
Royal Caribbean, and that the court accepted the averments as true
(since the appeal followed a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal of the plaintiff's
complaint). 2 ' Establishing an agency relationship requires: (1) acknowl-

14. Id. at 1229-30. Franza dropped the negligent hiring, retention, and training claim
on appeal. Id. at 1230 n.2.
15. Id. at 1230 (quoting Franza v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., 948 F. Supp. 2d 1327,
1331 (S.D. Fla. 2013)).
16. Id.
17. Id. at 1231.
18. Id. at 1232.
19. Id. at 1233 (citing examples). Federal courts routinely allow passengers to invoke
the doctrine of respondeat superior in maritime negligence suits (i.e., suit against an
individual tortfeasor's employer). Id. at 1234. The Eleventh Circuit could not identify any
logical reason to carve out claims for onboard medical negligence from this practice: "We
can see nothing inherent in onboard medical negligence, when committed by full-time
employees acting within the course and scope of their employment, that justifies
suspending the accepted principles of agency." Id. at 1235.
20. Id. at 1236.
21. Id.
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edgement by the principal that the agent will act for it; (2) acceptance
by the agent of the undertaking; and (3) the principal's control of the
purported agent's actions."
The facts, again taken from the complaint and accepted as true,
suggested Royal Caribbean held out the nurse and doctor to act on its
behalf, as well as an acceptance of the medical personnel to proceed with
such a role.2 3 Turning to the right of control, the court again easily
parsed the complaint to conclude sufficient facts were alleged which
plausibly demonstrated control by Royal Caribbean over its medical
personnel.24
On balance, then, Franza's complaint unambiguously establishes an
agency relationship between the employer, Royal Caribbean Cruises,
Ltd., and its full-time employees, Nurse Garcia and Dr. Gonzales ....
[W]e are compelled to hold that Franza's complaint sets out a plausible
basis for imputing to Royal Caribbean the allegedly negligent conduct
of its onboard medical employees.25
The court then conducted a more abbreviated review and analysis of
the alternative liability theory of apparent authority. 26 Distinguishing
respondeat superior, which derives from a principal's right of control
over the conduct of its agents, the Eleventh Circuit explained that
liability under apparent authority flows from equitable concerns:
"[L]iability may be appropriate under apparent agency principles when
a principal's conduct could equitably prevent it from denying the
existence of an agency relationship."" In Barbetta v. S/S Bermuda
Star,2 8 the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit evidently
did not address the question of apparent agency.29 This distinction has
supported decisions from multiple district courts within the Eleventh
Circuit to recognize a shipowner's liability under apparent agency
principles for onboard medical negligence."

22. Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted). The court explained that the right
of control is the "fulcrum of respondeat superior." Id.
23. Id. at 1236-37.
24. Id. at 1237.
25. Id. at 1238.
26. Id. at 1249-51.
27. Id. at 1249, 1250.
28. 848 F.2d 1364 (5th Cir. 1988).
29. Franza, 772 F.3d at 1250.
30. Id. (citing multiple cases). Indeed, the Eleventh Circuit observed that it was "the
first circuit to address whether a passenger may use apparent agency principles to hold a
cruise line vicariously liable for the onboard medical negligence of its employees." Id. at
1249.

2016]

ADMIRALTY

793

The Eleventh Circuit agreed with this approach, observing that
imposition of liability via apparent agency has a long history in the
maritime context and cited examples of liens arising by virtue of an
agent's ordering repairs, supplies, or necessaries for its principal's
ship." Based largely on its election to eschew the Barbetta rule, the
court found "no sound basis for allowing a special exception for onboard
medical negligence, particularly since we have concluded that actual
agency principles ought to be applied in this setting as well."3 2 The
determination is a fact-intensive inquiry, and the decision summarized
the litany of points raised with respect to apparent authority in Franza's
complaint." The case was reversed and remanded for further proceedings.34
It was evident the Eleventh Circuit was not going to follow the lead
of its sister circuit, or any of the other circuits which continue to shield
shipowners from claims arising out of alleged onboard medical negligence. "[T]he roots of the Barbetta rule snake back into a wholly
different world . . . . [D]espite its prominence, the Barbetta rule now
seems to prevail more by the strength of inertia than by the strength of
its reasoning."3 1
B.

Cruise Line's Duty to Warn of Shore-Based Hazards

There were a couple of cases decided by the Eleventh Circuit in 2014
and 2015 which continued the reasoning and analysis from Chaparrov.
36
Carnival Corporation.
While the Carnival cruise ship M/V VICTORY
was at a port call in St. Thomas, Virgin Islands, the Chaparro family
was caught in a gang-related shooting during their return bus ride from
a local beach recommended by a Carnival employee. One of the family
members was struck by a stray bullet and killed. The family sued
Carnival under a failure to warn theory.'
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court's summary
dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)." The court discussed the duty
of a cruise line to use reasonable care under the circumstances, "which
requires, as a prerequisite to imposing liability, that the carrier have

31. Id. at 1250-51 (collecting cases).
32. Id. at 1251.
33. Id. at 1252-53.
34. Id. at 1254.
35. Id. at 1239.
36. 693 F.3d 1333 (11th Cir. 2012). See discussion of the court's decision in the 2013
summary prepared by Colin McRae, Edgard Smith & Kate Lawson, Admiralty, Eleventh
Circuit Survey, 64 MERCER L. REV. 829, 832 (2013).
37. Chaparro, 693 F.3d at 1335.
38. Id.
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had actual or constructive notice of the risk-creating condition, at least
where .

.

. the menace is one commonly encountered on land and not

clearly linked to nautical adventure."" The lower court's order
dismissing the suit was reversed, as there was evidence presented which
suggested Carnival had knowledge of potential gang-related activity,
including shootings, in or around the beach where the family was
visiting.4 0
In the 2014 case Burdeaux v. Royal CaribbeanCruises, Ltd., 41 a cruise
ship passenger was sexually assaulted while shopping in Cozumel.4 2 The
plaintiff departed the Royal Caribbean vessel OASIS OF THE SEAS and
was provided a shopping map by the cruise line which depicted "[c]ertain
'guaranteed and recommended shops.""'
The plaintiff stopped at a
jewelry cart not identified on the map and was told by the vendor that
he had additional merchandise in a nearby store. The plaintiff left the
designated shopping area and followed the man to his store where she
was assaulted. Suit was filed in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Florida. Following discovery, the court granted the
cruise line's motion for summary judgment, holding there was no
evidence that Royal Caribbean had actual or constructive knowledge of
a heightened risk for sexual assault in the area where the attack took
place.44
On appeal, the plaintiff argued: (1) the trial court erred by focusing on
the exact type of crime involved (sexual assault or rape), rather than
violent crime in general; and (2) considering only evidence specific to the
location where Royal Caribbean passengers were invited to visit (the
recommended shopping district), rather than Cozumel generally.4 The
Eleventh Circuit dispatched the first issue in swift fashion, holding the
plaintiff's complaint and summary judgment pleadings themselves were
narrowly focused only on the issue of sexual assault or rape. 6 With
respect to the second issue-warning of dangers outside the recommended shopping district-the court held there was inadequate evidence to
support an inference that the cruise line knew or should have known of
a heightened risk of sexual assault or rape in Cozumel.4 7 The evidence

39. Id. at 1336 (alteration in original) (quoting Keefe v. Bahama Cruise Line, Inc., 867
F.2d 1318, 1322 (11th Cir. 1989)).
40. Id. at 1337.
41. 562 F. App'x 932 (11th Cir. 2014).
42. Id. at 934.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 935.
46. Id. at 936.
47. Id.
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presented by the plaintiff included State Department warnings and
affidavits from a former cruise ship employee, as well as a local resident.
However, the State Department warnings did not address sexual assault
in Cozumel, and the affidavits consisted largely of anecdotal evidence.'
A second case, Moseley v. Carnival Corp.,4 involved personal injury to
a cruise ship passenger when a bathroom sink dislodged and fell on her
at the Freeport Harbor, Bahamas, during a port call. This lawsuit
attempted to impose liability upon Carnival for failure to warn about
dangerous conditions in the on-shore bathroom facilities. Alternatively,
the plaintiff claimed Carnival was vicariously liable for the negligence
of Freeport Harbor Company, the operator of the bathroom facilities.
The district court granted Carnival's Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion to
dismiss for failure to state a claim.o
The Eleventh Circuit agreed that the complaint failed to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted under either theory." The complaint
failed to allege any facts to support Carnival's actual or constructive
notice of a danger at the bathroom facility in the Freeport Harbor.52
Likewise, the complaint failed to demonstrate that Freeport Harbor
Company knew or should have known of a risk of harm and failed to
correct the problem with the bathroom sink." Consequently, Moseley's
efforts to impose vicarious liability on Carnival for the negligence of
Freeport failed as well.
II.

A.

SEAMEN'S CLAIMS

Assignment of Wages

In Jurich v. Compass Marine, Inc.,ss four plaintiffs filed a putative
class action against the employment agency which placed them in their
jobs as seamen. The employment agency received payment for its
services by taking a portion of wages earned by the seamen; one of the
documents signed by the individuals included a "Paycheck Mailing
Agreement." The Paycheck Mailing Agreement required each seaman's
employer to mail paychecks directly to the employment agency so the
agency could take its cut. This practice continued until the underlying

48. Id.
49. 593 F. App'x 890 (11th Cir. 2014).
50. Id. at 891.
51. Id. at 893.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 1303.
55. 764 F.3d 1302 (11th Cir. 2014).
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debt (charge for finding employment) was paid in full. The Agreement's
terms stated that it was irrevocable until the debt had been fully
discharged.5 6
Even though both parties received the benefit of the bargain-the
mariners were placed in jobs, and the agency received its agreed upon
fee-the seamen filed suit asserting a claim for wages under general
maritime law and alleged the wage assignments were invalid under 46
U.S.C. § 11109(b)," which states that a seaman's "assignment . . . of
wages .. . made before the payment of wages does not bind the party
making it . .. ."" In affirming summary judgment for the employment
agency, the Eleventh Circuit specifically adopted Smith v. Seaport
Marine, Inc." and Jurich v. Compass Marine, Inc.,eo two opinions issued
by the district court."
In Smith, the district court explained that "§ 11109(b) does not provide
a private right of action or purport to create any remedy (in damages or
otherwise) for a seaman who has executed a non-binding assignment of
wages."" The district court pointed out that the statute, in relevant
part, was fairly straightforward and simple: "[A]n assignment or sale of
wages ...
made before the payment of wages does not bind a party
making it."" It does not say such assignment is unlawful or any
contract making such an assignment is void.64 It merely provides an
assignment-such as those contained in the Paycheck Mailing Agreements at issue-does not bind the party making it. 5
Further, the district court opined that characterizing the Paycheck
Mailing Agreements as "irrevocable" was inconsistent with the text of
§ 11109(b)." In this case, however, there was no evidence either the
seamen or the employment agency attempted to rely on that word, or the

56. Id.
57. 46 U.S.C. § 11109(b) (2012).
58. Id.
59. 981 F. Supp. 2d 1188 (S.D. Ala. 2013).
60. No. 12-0176-WS-B, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 159557 (S.D. Ala. Nov. 7, 2013).
61. Jurich, 764 F.3d at 1304.
62. 981 F. Supp. 2d at 1195.
63. Id. at 1198 (alteration in original) (quoting 46 U.S.C. § 11109(b)).
64. Id. at 1198-99.
65. Id. at 1199.
66. Id. at 1199-1200. Interestingly, both the trial and appellate courts agreed that the
inclusion of the word "irrevocable" in the wage assignment "was improper and contrary to
the plaintiffs' clear statutory right under § 11109(b), which provides that the seamen were
not bound by those agreements." Jurich, 764 F.3d at 1304 ("[I]f Compass and Seaport
continue using the word 'irrevocable' in their Paycheck Mailing Agreements, they may do
so at their eventual peril.").
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ostensible irrevocability of the contract." Specifically, there was no
evidence that the employment agency ever tried to enforce the irrevocable contract term, that the seamen ever attempted to revoke the
agreement, or that the seamen ever inquired whether the agreement was
binding or revocable."
Finally, the district court seemed troubled by the inequity of the
seamen's position; they wanted the benefits of the employment agencies'
efforts but now sought to renege on their obligation to pay for the same.
Such result would be wholly inconsistent with the equitable principles
of maritime law.6 9

This case should be carefully reviewed and discussed with clients
providing employment services to mariners. Certainly, some contractual
mechanism is needed to ensure payment for services rendered. Care
must be taken, however, in light of the Eleventh Circuit's admonition
that characterizing an agreement as "irrevocable" is inconsistent with
the text of 46 U.S.C. § 11109(b). 70
B.

PersonalInjury Claims
In Skye v. Maersk Line, Ltd.,n the plaintiff, William C. Skye, served
as the chief mate aboard the Maersk vessel SEALAND PRIDE between
2000 and 2008. His work duties were arduous. This caused Skye a great
deal of stress and wreaked havoc on his sleeping patterns.72 Skye was
diagnosed with arrhythmia which later evolved into left ventricular
hypertrophy, described in the opinion as "a thickening of the heart wall
of the left ventricle."" His cardiologist attributed this malady to
hypertension. Eventually, Skye's cardiologist advised him to stop
working on the vessel.
Skye filed suit under the Jones Act, 7 alleging that Maersk negligently
failed to provide him with reasonable working hours and instead worked
him past the point of fatigue, which ultimately caused his physical
ailments. A jury agreed and awarded Skye $2,362,299, but it also found
Skye was seventy-five percent at fault for his injuries. The court

67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
2015).
72.
73.
74.
75.

Smith, 981 F. Supp. 2d at 1200.
Id.
Id. at 1203-04.
See Jurich, 764 F.3d at 1304.
751 F.3d 1262 (11th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 3032 (May 4,
Id. at 1263.
Id. at 1264.
Id. at 1263.
46 U.S.C. § 30104 (2012).
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reduced the verdict accordingly and awarded Skye $590,574.75.
Maersk's motion for judgment as a matter of law was denied."
Relying upon Consrail v. Gottshall, the Eleventh Circuit reversed
and rendered judgment in favor of Maersk, holding "[t]he Jones Act does
not allow seaman to recover for injuries caused by work-related stress
because work-related stress is not a 'physical peril.'" 8 The decision in
Gottshall involved the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA),"9 the
case law of which informs Jones Act jurisprudence.o In Gottshall, the
United States Supreme Court held injuries caused by work-related stress
are not cognizable under FELA absent a physical impact or fear from the
threat of physical impact.8 ' In reaching this conclusion, the Supreme
Court adopted a zone of danger test for injuries not directly caused by
physical impact, holding such injuries would be compensable "only if
[plaintiff] was injured when he was within the zone of danger of a
physical impact caused by his employer's negligence."8 2
The Eleventh Circuit followed the Supreme Court's lead in Gottshall
and emphasized the statutory focus on protecting employees from
physical perils: "An arduous work schedule and an irregular sleep
schedule are not physical perils. That Skye developed a 'physical injury'
is no matter; the cause of his injury was work-related stress."" This
conclusion was justified, in part, on the need to establish a bright-line
test and avoid the "'flood of trivial suits, the possibility of fraudulent
claims . . . and the specter of unlimited and unpredictable liability'
because there is no way to predict what effect a stressful work environment-compared to a physical accident such as an exploding boiler-would have on any given employee."
While creating a bright-line rule, putative plaintiffs whose working
conditions create legitimate physical ailments are left without recourse
for damages as a result of the Skye decision (save, perhaps, for
maintenance and cure should the illness manifest itself while aboard
ship). Some commentators have suggested that the Eleventh Circuit

76. Skye, 751 F.3d at 1264-65.
77. 512 U.S. 532 (1994).
78. Skye, 751 F.3d at 1266 (quoting Gottshall, 512 U.S. at 555).
79. 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (2012).
80. Skye, 751 F.3d at 1265. "The Jones Act incorporated the remedial scheme of the
Federal Employers' Liability Act, and case law interpreting the latter statute also applies
to the Jones Act." Id.
81. Gottshall, 512 U.S. at 558.
82. Skye, 751 F.3d at 1266.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 1267.

20161

ADMIRALTY

799

went too far in extending the physical injury/zone of danger test from
Gottshall:
But the Skye court might not have been right in attributing a broad
rule against work-stress-caused injuries to Gottshall. A more conservative reading of the Gottshall work-stress rule would rule out emotional
trauma resulting from work-place stresses but not necessarily physical
trauma such as Skye's ....
Quite possibly the issue presented by
Skye's case-can FELA or Jones Act plaintiffs ever maintain viable
actions for physical trauma induced by negligently severe work-place
stresses?-would be seen by the Supreme Court as res nova.5
C.

Arbitrationof Foreign Seafarer's Claims

The decision in Martinez v. Carnival Corp." is an example of the
Eleventh Circuit's continuing enforcement of arbitration clauses found
in foreign seafarer's arbitration contracts. There, cruise ship worker
Melvin Martinez sustained back injuries during the course of his
employment aboard Carnival's vessel, the FASCINATION. Suit was
filed in Florida State Court but removed to the Southern District of
Florida where the trial court granted Carnival's motion to compel
arbitration. All other pending motions were deemed moot and the case
was closed for administrative purposes.
Carnival first challenged whether the order compelling arbitration was
a non-appealable, interlocutory order." The court observed that the
Federal Arbitration Act" provides for appeal of "a final decision with
respect to an arbitration."" Appealable final orders are such that there
is nothing left for the court to do other than execute the judgment." The
wrinkle here was the trial court's decision to "administratively" close the
matter, which ostensibly could permit the lower court to reopen it.92 In
the instant case, however, the Eleventh Circuit deemed the order final

85.

David W. Robertson & Michael F. Sturley, Recent Developments in Admiralty and

Maritime Law at the NationalLevel and in the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits, 39 TUL.

MAR.

L.J. 471, 543 (2015).
86. 744 F.3d 1240 (11th Cir. 2014).
87. Id. at 1242-43. Martinez was one of several cases decided by the Eleventh Circuit
during the survey period which addressed arbitration of foreign seafarer's claims. See, e.g.,
Sierra v. Cruise Ships Catering & Servs. Int'l, N.V., No. 14-14940, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS
19535, at *1 (11th Cir. Nov. 10, 2015); Naverette v. Silversea Cruises Ltd., 620 F. App'x
793 (11th Cir. 2015).
88. Martinez, 744 F.3d at 1243.
89. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2012).
90. Martinez, 744 F.3d at 1243 (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(3) (2012)).
91. Id. at 1243-44.
92. Id. at 1244.
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and thus appealable: "In this case, the district court not only administratively closed the case, but it also denied all pending motions as moot
and compelled arbitration. The district court's order was a functionally
final and appealable decision because it left nothing more for the court
to do but execute the judgment.""
Turning to the arbitration issue, Martinez first argued that the
agreement expired when he disembarked the vessel. The particular
Seafarer's Agreement terminated automatically, by its terms, when the
seaman made an unscheduled departure from the ship (e.g., for illness
or injury), lasting more than one full voyage." However, the Seafarer's
Agreement also contemplated it would embrace "any and all disputes
arising out of or in connection with this Agreement, including any
question regarding its existence, validity, or termination . . ..
Because parties can arbitrate the very question of arbitrability in the
first instance, the court held an arbitrator could decide whether the
contract had been terminated." Acknowledging the federal policy
favoring arbitration of labor disputes, the court held the seaman's
dispute with Carnival clearly arose out of his service aboard the vessel,
which was governed by the Seafarer's Agreement."
III.

SALVAGE

In Martin v. One Bronze Rod," plaintiff Francisco Martin extricated
a bronze rod buried in the Peace River Basin (De Soto County, Florida)
and claimed to have pinpointed the location of three nearby treasure
chests believed to contain "piratical cargo buried by the Gasparilla
Pirates over 150 years ago . . . ."" To obtain control of the property,
Martin filed a verified complaint in the United States District Court for
the Middle District of Florida, attaching to the complaint a 3.5 inch
segment of the recovered bronze rod.' 00 Martin's verified complaint
included a claim pursuant to the general maritime law of salvage,
forfeiture claims pursuant to 33 U.S.C. §§ 383,101 384,102 and 385,103 and

93. Id. at 1245.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 1245 (quoting the Seafarer's Agreement).
96. Id. at 1246.
97. Id. at 1246, 1247.
98. 581 F. App'x 744 (11th Cir. 2014).
99. Id. at 745.
100. Id. at 747 n.4. Martin claimed that he was prevented from securing the buried
chests because they were located on private property and state-owned lands. Id. at 745.
101. 33 U.S.C. § 383 (2012).
102. 33 U.S.C. § 384 (2012).
103. 33 U.S.C. § 385 (2012).
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possessory and ownership claims pursuant to the law of finds.1 0 4 Martin
also moved for "a warrant of arrest in rem against the rod and the chests
under Rules C and G of the Supplemental Rules for Admiralty and
Maritime Claims and Asset Forfeiture Actions . . . .""' The district
court awarded Martin full title to the rod as payment for his salvage
efforts, but denied the requests for in rem relief against the three stillburied treasure chests.0 6
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit recounted the familiar standards to
pursue a salvage claim: (1) a maritime peril; (2) a voluntary act-as
opposed to contractual salvage; and (3) success in helping, at least in
part, to save the imperiled property.' 0 7 The court further noted,
"'Success is essential to the claim; as if the property is not saved, or if
it perish, or in case of capture if it is not retaken, no compensation can
be allowed.""0 s Success is inherent in being able to present the res to
the court in order to establish custody and control of the property.'0 o
Holding Martin failed to demonstrate the requisite control or success in
salving the buried treasure, the court affirmed dismissal of his salvage
claim."1
Turning to Martin's forfeiture claims, the appellate court first observed
that the provisions relied upon by plaintiff dealt with regulations to
suppress piracy and were otherwise distinguishable from the claims at
hand."' Likewise, these regulations required "capture" of the subject
property (be it a pirate ship, or in this case, buried pirate treasure). The

104. Martin, 581 F. App'x at 745.
105. Id. at 745-46. If the court determines a prima facie case for an in rem action
exists, it is compelled to "'issue an order directing the clerk to issue a warrant for the
arrest of the vessel or other property that is the subject of the action.'" Id. at 746 n.3
(quoting FED. R. CIV. P. Supp. C(3)(a)(i)). Rule G works "in conjunction with Rule C and
governs forfeiture actions in rem arising from a federal statute." Id. (quoting FED. R. Civ.
P. Supp. R. G(3)(b)(ii)).
106. Id. at 747.
107. Id. at 748.
108. Id. (quoting The Blackwall, 77 U.S. 1, 12 (1869)).
109. Id. The Eleventh Circuit noted that certain cases do exist where in rem
jurisdiction is exercised over property not before the court; the ability to do so is based
upon a fiction that the property is part of an undivided res (for example, a shipwreck), and
therefore "possession of some of it is constructively possession of all." Id. (quoting R.M.S.
Titanic, Inc. v. Haver, 171 F.3d 943, 964 (4th Cir. 1999)). Martin repeatedly said in his
pleadings that the rod and the chests were not from the same shipwreck, and that the
chests were intentionally buried. See id. at 749 n.6.
110. Id. at 749.
111. Id.
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chests were still buried, and Martin could not demonstrate he "captured"
them in sufficient fashion to pursue a forfeiture claim. 112
IV.

FORUM NON CONVENIENS

In Vasquez v. YII Shipping Co., 11 3 the plaintiff was severely burned

while working aboard the M/V YEOCOMICO. The accident and injuries
occurred while the vessel was docked in Freeport, Bahamas." 4 YII
Shipping owned the YEOCOMICO, which "had sailed exclusively interisland routes in the Bahamas when Vasquez's accident occurred and had
done so for the previous two years.""' The plaintiff, Franklin Vasquez, a resident of the Dominican Republic, filed a Jones Act suit in the
Southern District of Florida.116
The district court dismissed the case based on the doctrine of forum
non conveniens."' On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit first observed that,
"[i]f a plaintiff files a complaint that invokes admiralty jurisdiction, a
district court may not dismiss the complaint based on forum non
conveniens if federal maritime law applies.""' However, "[i]f federal
maritime law does not apply, then the district court considers the
traditional criteria of forum non conveniens to determine whether it
should exercise jurisdiction over the case.""e
The appellate court identified and briefly discussed the seven factors
identified by the U.S. Supreme Court in Lauritzen v. Larsen"10 to
determine whether federal maritime law applied to Mr. Vasquez's
claims: (1) place of the wrongful act; (2) the ship's flag state; (3) domicile
of the injured party; (4) domicile of the defendant ship owner; (5) place
of any contract between the injured party and the shipowner; (6) the
accessibility of a foreign forum; and (7) the law of the forum. 12 ' The
appellate court added an eighth factor considered by the Supreme Court
in Hellenic Lines Ltd. v. Rhoditis;122 to wit, whether the putative
defendant had a "substantial base of operations" in the United

112.
"finds."
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

Id. at 750. The court ruled that Martin abandoned his claim under the law of
Id. at 745 n.2.
559 F. App'x 841 (11th Cir. 2014).
Id. at 842.
Id.
Id. at 841-42.
Id. at 841-43.
Id. at 843.
Id.
345 U.S. 571 (1953).
Vasquez, 559 F. App'x at 843.
398 U.S. 306 (1970).
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States. 23 The appellate court concluded the district court did not abuse
its discretion in applying the above-listed factors and dismissing
Vasquez's complaint on forum non conveniens grounds.'
V.

A.

MARINE INSURANCE

Doctrine of Uberrimae Fidei

'

The case AIG Centennial Insurance Co. v. O'Neilll25 addressed a
dispute over marine insurance for the BRYEMERE, a 66 foot sportfishing vessel purchased by Bryan O'Neill for $2.125 million. The vessel
was financed by Bank of America, NA (BOA), which obtained a preferred
ship mortgage to cover its interests in the vessel. BOA required
insurance on the vessel, but mistakes were made during efforts to secure
coverage on the BRYEMERE which ultimately resulted in voiding the
marine insurance policy ab initio."2
Specifically, O'Neill delegated the task of obtaining insurance to his
secretary, who made three errors on the application: (1) incorrectly
listing O'Neill as the owner of the vessel, as opposed to the title owner
Carolina Acquisition, LLC;12 7 (2) mistakenly responding to inquiry about
prior losses; and (3) incorrectly listing the purchase price as $2.35
million, instead of the correct adjusted purchase price of $2.125
million. 128
During transit from Palm Beach, Florida to Newport, Rhode Island in
June 2007, the vessel experienced considerable flexing in its hull. A
survey determined the BRYEMERE suffered serious structural defects,
rendering it unseaworthy. O'Neill submitted a claim to AIG Centennial
Insurance Company (AIG) for coverage under his insurance policy. 2 9
AIG filed a declaratory judgment action seeking to void the policy ab
initio (from the outset) as to both O'Neill and the BOA, who held an
interest in the insurance policy pursuant to the contract's mortgage
clause. Following an eight-day bench trial, the district court found the
misrepresentations made during the application process "rendered the

123. Vasquez, 559 F. App'x at 843.
124. Id. at 844.
125. 782 F.3d 1296 (11th Cir. 2015).
126. Id. at 1299-1300.
127. Id. at 1299-1301. O'Neill was the only shareholder of Carolina Acquisition, LLC.
Id. at 1299.
128. Id. at 1300.
129. Id. at 1301.
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policy void ab initio under the maritime doctrine of uberrimae fidei, or
utmost good faith.""'o
The Eleventh Circuit adheres to the longstanding principle of
uberrimae fidei as a controlling doctrine regarding marine insurance.'' The obligation of good faith imposes the duty on the insured to
fully disclose all material facts relevant to the calculation of the
insurance risks.' 32 A fact is material if it could "possibly influence the
mind of a prudent and intelligent insurer in determining whether he
would accept the risks.""s' The concept of materiality is "broadly
defined."' 4 Moreover, a misrepresentation can act to void a policy
regardless of whether it is willful, accidental, made as a result of
mistake, negligence, or voluntary ignorance.'
The district court determined O'Neill misrepresented the purchase
price of his vessel to the tune of a $225,000 difference.' 36 Stressing that
the purchase price has a significant impact on the amount and issuance
of hull insurance, the Eleventh Circuit held the lower court did not
clearly err in determining this was a material misrepresentation which
voided the policy ab initio vis-A-vis O'Neill.' The court did not turn
to the other alleged misrepresentations, deeming one is all that is
necessary to void the policy."a
The Eleventh Circuit next turned to BOA's interests as the mortgage
holder for the BRYEMERE. This is an issue governed not by maritime
law but by state law, in this case Pennsylvania.3 3 Examining Pennsylvania law, the court deemed that the policy contained a "union" or
"standard" mortgage clause. 4 0 This provided additional protection to
a mortgagee such that the policy "shall not be invalidated by any act or

130. Id. at 1301-02.
131. Id. at 1302-03. Cf. Albany Ins. Co. v. Anh Thi Kieu, 927 F.2d 882, 889 (5th Cir.
1991) (rejecting notion of uberrimaefidei as entrenched doctrine of federal maritime law).
132. AIG Centennial Ins. Co., 782 F.3d at 1303.
133. Id. (quoting Kilpatrick Marine Piling v. the Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 795 F.2d 940,
942-43 (11th Cir. 1986)).

134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 1303-04.
137. Id. at 1305.
138. Id. at 1305-06.
139. Id. at 1306-07. It is not clear from the opinion why Pennsylvania law applied to
this marine insurance contract. There is no choice-of-law clause cited or quoted in the
Eleventh Circuit's opinion. The order simply notes, "The District Court concluded, and the
parties do not currently dispute, that Pennsylvania law should guide our analysis." Id. at
1306.
140. Id. at 1307.
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neglect of the mortgagor or owner of the property.""' BOA argued its
interests were protected by the insurance coverage regardless of any act
or omission of O'Neill in the application process due to the (essentially)
separate and independent contract of insurance created between the
mortgagee and creditor by virtue of the "union" or "standard" mortgage
clause.142
The court, however, disagreed and summarized the dispositive issues
as follows: "[We are confronted with a scenario in which the named
insured is neither the owner of the property insured by the policy nor
the mortgagor on the loan for which the property serves as collateral.""'
This was important, in the court's view, inasmuch as the
governing jurisprudence conflated the identity of the mortgagor with the
named insured.'4 4 The difference between O'Neill (individually) and the
boat-owning corporate entity (Carolina Acquisition, LLC) was "no mere
technicality."'
In concluding its analysis, the Eleventh Circuit
emphasized "AIG and Carolina never entered into an insurance contract
at all. O'Neill signed the mortgage in his capacity as managing member
of Carolina; the insurance policy, by contrast, is in O'Neill's name
alone."1 4 6 This supported the district court's conclusion O'Neill was
acting on his own behalf, not on behalf of the vessel-owning limited
liability company in procuring the insurance policy.14 7
There was a concurring opinion by Judge Kristi DuBose, United States
District Judge for the Southern District of Alabama, sitting by designation. Judge DuBose made reference to O'Neill's status perhaps as an
agent of the owner/limited liability company.4 8 This appears to be a
valid point inasmuch as the mortgage clause specifically said the
interests of BOA would not be "impaired or invalidated by any act or
omission, or neglect of the mortgagor, owner, master, agent or crew of
the vessel(s) insured by this policy, or by failure to comply with any
warranty or condition over what the Mortgagee has no control."' 9 The
majority seemed to dispatch this idea by noting the insurance application lacked any mention of O'Neill's role as an agent or his position as

141.
(3d Cir.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

Id. (quoting Gallatin Fuels, Inc. v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co., 244 F. App'x 424,429
2007)).
Id.
Id. at 1308.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1309.
Id.
Id. at 1310-11 (Dubose, J., concurring).
Id. at 1306.
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'

5
"More still, the
managing member of Carolina Acquisition, LLC."'
insurance application stands in stark contrast to the mortgage, which
O'Neill did sign in his capacity as Carolina's managing member."15
The moral of this story is applications for marine insurance should not
be delegated without some follow-up, as clerical errors may constitute
material misrepresentations sufficient to void the policy under the
doctrine of uberrimae fidei.

B.

"All Risk" Marine Policy
The decision in LaMadrid v. National Union Fire Insurance Co.1 5 2
required interpretation of an all-risk marine policy covering an eightyfive foot yacht, the ALICIA, which suffered catastrophic engine failure
during normal operations."'3
The district court granted summary
judgment, but the Eleventh Circuit reversed, holding the trial court
improperly placed the burden of establishing the precise cause of engine
failure on the insured.1 5 4

While en route from the Bahamas to Miami, the ALICIA's starboard
engine began billowing smoke. Upon return to dock, it was discovered
that the engine was beyond repair. LaMadrid (insured) reported the loss
to his agent and filed an insurance claim. The insurer sent an adjuster
to investigate, but he made the conclusory decision that the loss was
simply due to wear, tear, and corrosion.' 5 5 Citing the policy's wear and
tear exclusion, coverage for the loss was denied.' 5 6 The insured's expert
concluded the cause of the failure was "a relief valve in the oil system
that was fixed in the open position."1 7 The district court granted the
insurance company's motion for summary judgment, concluding plaintiffs
failed to present evidence "to establish that a fortuitous event [was] the
cause of the damage to the relief valve."'
The Eleventh Circuit began its analysis by exploring which law to
apply: federal maritime law or Florida state law.'"' The starting point
of such analysis is the familiar holding of Wilburn Boat Co. v. Fireman's

160. Id. at 1309 n.13.
151. Id. (emphasis in original).
152. 567 F. App'x 695 (11th Cir. 2014), motion denied, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15162
(S.D. Fla. Feb. 9, 2015).

153. Id. at 696.
154. Id. at 701-02, 703.
155. Id. at 696-97.
156.

Id. at 697.

157. Id.
158. Id. at 701.
159. Id. at 698.
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60
Fund Insurance Co.o
Wilburn Boat Co. and its progeny hold marine

insurance policies are to be construed according to state law in the
absence of controlling federal maritime precedent.1 6' In the instant case,
this was a distinction without a difference as "Florida law and federal
maritime law are not materially different with regard to the narrow
question[s] present[ed] before the Court."1 62
Specifically, the court determined that under an all-risk policy, the
insured can carry its burden to show that a loss is covered if they
demonstrate the loss was accidental and fortuitous.'6 3 The district court
had improperly required the insured to demonstrate a specific cause of
loss.' 64 "By requiring Appellants to pinpoint 'why' the relief valve failed,
the District Court, in essence, required Appellants to demonstrate the
precise cause of the starboard engine's failure in order to meet their
burden of establishing a fortuitous loss.""

This was inappropriate,

and the insured met their "light burden by presenting expert testimony
on the cause of the engine's failure" (sticky relief valve) and by
establishing an otherwise unexplained loss occurred before the end of the
engine's anticipated lifecycle.' 66 Requiring an insured to prove much
more would run contrary to the purposes of an all-risk insurance
policy.'6 7
VI.

LIMITATION OF LIABILITY

The court's decision in Offshore of the Palm Beaches, Inc. v. Lynch'"'
reaffirms the right of a single claimant in a limitation action to proceed
with a state court suit once appropriate protective stipulations have been
filed.' 6 9 Lisa Lynch was injured when the recreational boat in which
she was riding struck a wave. The accident happened on October 31,
2011. An attorney wrote to the vessel owner (Offshore of the Palm
Beaches, Inc.) on February 6, 2012, advising that he represented Lynch
and requesting insurance information. Offshore of the Palm Beaches,
Inc. filed a limitation action six months later on August 6, 2012. Lynch
was the only party to file a claim in the limitation action.'"0 She also

160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

348 U.S. 310 (1955).
LaMadrid, 567 F. App'x at 699.
Id. at 700.
Id. at 701.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 701-02.
Id. at 702.
741 F.3d 1251 (11th Cir. 2014).
Id. at 1259.
Id. at 1253.
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filed "detailed stipulations designed to protect Offshore's right to litigate
any limitation of liability in federal district court.""' In light of these
stipulations, the federal district court stayed the limitation action, thus
allowing Lynch to proceed with her personal injury claims in state court.
Offshore appealed from the order granting Lynch's request to stay the
limitation action. 1 72
The Eleventh Circuit dispatched Lynch's argument that the order was
non-appealable as a non-final order: "Our case precedent instead compels
the conclusion that we have jurisdiction under [28 U.S.C.] § 1292(a)(1)
to review the trial court's order modifying or dissolving an injunction."1 73

The substantive issue on appeal highlighted, once again, the tension
between a vessel owner's right to seek protection under the Limitation
of Liability Act (Limitation Act)1 74 and the right of tort claimants to
have their day in the forum of their selection (usually a state court with
a jury requested)."' The Eleventh Circuit observed that the Supreme
Court has "limited the tension between the Limitation Act and the
'saving to suitors' clause by carving out an exception when a vessel
owner faces only a single claimant."7
In a single claimant situation-such as that presented by Lynch's claim-the federal court retains
jurisdiction to decide issues unique to its admiralty jurisdiction, while
allowing the claimant to proceed with her tort claim in a state court
venue. This is essentially an automatic result once the claimant agrees
to protective stipulations, the terms of which are well-settled by
precedent.1 7 7

One note with respect to timing of a limitation action: the vessel
owner filed suit six months after receiving a letter from Lynch's attorney
advising of representation and asking for insurance information.1 7 1
The Limitation Act requires the vessel owner to bring an action in
district court "within 6 months after a claimant gives the owner written
notice of a claim."7 7 This requirement is jurisdictional, and the failure
to abide by this time limit will result in a limitation action being

171. Id. at 1253-54.
172. Id. at 1254.
173. Id. at 1255; see 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) (2012).
174. 46 U.S.C. §§ 30501-30512 (2012).
175. See Offshore of the Palm Beaches, Inc., 741 F.3d at 1257-58.
176. Id. at 1258 (emphasis in original).
177. Id. Another exception which may allow erstwhile claimants return passage to
state court exists in a multiple claimant-adequate limitation fund scenarios. Id.
178. See id. at 1254.
179. 46 U.S.C. § 30511(a) (2012).
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dismissed as time barred."so Courts have held that letters and/or
emails from litigants or their counsel to a vessel owner can constitute
sufficient notice if the exchanges reveal a "reasonable possibility" that
a claim could exceed the value of the vessel, thus triggering the sixmonth time limit within which to file suit under the Limitation Act. 81
VII.

MARITIME LIENS AND ATTACHMENT PROCEEDINGS

D & M CarriersLLC v. M/V THOR SPIRIT
In the case of D & M CarriersLLC v. M/V THOR SPIRIT,1 82 D
M Carriers LLC (D & M) was a motor carrier which filed suit in an
attempt to assert a maritime lien against a vessel which it transported
from Missouri to Georgia. D & M also filed a breach of contract action
against the vessel owner. The district court dismissed both claims, and
this appeal followed."
Inan Taptik, a citizen of Turkey, contracted with Able Boat Transport,
LLC to move a fifty-seven foot yacht from Missouri to Florida.
Unbeknownst to Taptik, Able Boat then subcontracted with D & M to
actually transport the vessel. Because of the boat's size, the inland
transport was more difficult, much longer, and more expensive than
anticipated.18 A dispute arose over payment, with D & M failing to
receive the amount promised and reimbursement for extraordinary
expenses. D & M filed a complaint in the Southern District of Florida
seeking to establish a maritime lien on the MIV THOR SPIRIT and
arrest the vessel."'5 The district court ultimately ruled D & M was not
entitled to maritime lien on the M/V THOR SPIRIT because "it had
failed to prove that it had provided necessaries to the yacht 'on the order
&

A.

of the owner or a person authorized by the owner."" 8 6

The Federal Maritime Lien Act'"' defines "necessaries" to include
"repairs, supplies, towage."'1 8 Note that the appellate court did not
reach the issue of whether the overland transport constituted "neces180. See, e.g., RLB Contr., Inc. v. Butler, 773 F.3d 596, 600 (5th Cir. 2014).
181. Id. at 604.
182. 586 F. App'x 564 (11th Cir. 2014).
183. Id. at 565-66, 567.
184. Id. at 565-66. For example, the opinion notes that the trucking company could not
use interstate highways, and the escort crew "had to lift more than 20,000 power lines, tree
limbs, and street lights over the course of the trip." Id. at 566.
185. Id. at 567.
186. Id. (quoting 46 U.S.C. § 31342(a) (2012)).
187. 46 U.S.C. §§ 31301-31343 (2012).
188. D & M CarriersLLC, 586 F. App'x at 567 n.5 (quoting 46 U.S.C. § 31301(4)
(2012)).
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saries" under the Maritime Lien Act."" Certain individuals are
presumed to have authority to procure necessaries for a vessel, including
an owner, master, person entrusted with the management of a ship, and
agents or officers appointed by an owner or charterer.' In this case,
the issue preserved for appeal was whether Able Boat had authority to
obtain necessaries for the M/V THOR SPIRIT in its ostensible capacity
as the owner's agent."' D & M also contended it was acting pursuant
to directions from Taptik (owner).'92 Taking these issues in reverse
order, the Eleventh Circuit agreed that Taptik did not personally
authorize D & M to transport the vessel.' Taptik's only contract was
with Able Boat, which never told Taptik that it had subcontracted the
work to D & M.1 9 4

Likewise, the court held Able Boat was not acting as Taptik's agent
with respect to its interactions with D & M.' 9 ' The court determined
Able Boat did not have the express authority to act in this capacity, nor
was the company cloaked with apparent authority to act as Taptik's
agent.'9 6 Evidence demonstrated Taptik never spoke to anybody
affiliated with D & M and the contract for transport of the vessel existed
only between Taptik and Able Boat.'
Additionally, there was no
agreement which ever authorized Able Boat to act as Taptik's agent.198
This is an interesting case, one which would present a good law school
exam question. Assume that Taptik (owner) had engaged D & M
directly to transport his boat. Would maritime jurisdiction exist in the
first instance? If the vessel was not in navigable waters at any point in
time during provision of the services, jurisdiction based on a contract
claim would seem to be missing, as would the right to use a maritime
lien to secure payment for purely land-based services.

189. Id.
190. 46 U.S.C. § 31341(a)(1)-(4) (2012).
191. D & M CarriersLLC, 586 F. App'x at 569.
192. Id. at 569-70.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 570-71.
195. Id. at 571.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id. The appellate court also affirmed the district court's decision that Taptik's
assistant/interpreter (Murat Varol) was not acting as Taptik's agent with respect to either
instructions or authority for transport of the vessel. Id.
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World Wide Supply OU v. Quail Cruises Ship Management

The underlying facts of World Wide Supply OU v. Quail Cruises Ship
Management,9 9 are confusing. Of some passing interest is the fact
that the litigants were embroiled in a dispute involving the vessel
featured on "The Love Boat" television program. At bottom, however,
the case is instructive on jurisdiction for appeals involving Rule B
attachments.2 00
The plaintiff, World Wide Supply OU, contracted with Quail Cruises
Ship Management (Quail) to supply necessaries to the M/V GEMINI.
When it was not paid, World Wide Supply OU filed an emergency motion
to attach and garnish funds allegedly belonging to Quail. The money
was held in a law firm's trust account for distribution to third-parties as
a result of a settlement agreement Quail had reached with said entities.
The district court vacated the attachment (for reasons discussed below),
and this appeal followed. 201
The recipients of the settlement funds (designated as "interested
parties-appellees"), argued the appellate court lacked jurisdiction
because the res (funds) had been transferred out of the district through
the ordinary course of business (i.e., the recipients of the settlement
funds had already received the money).202
The Eleventh Circuit
observed that appeals from in rem forfeiture actions are not mooted by
the prevailing party's removal of the res from the original district. 203
The Eleventh Circuit followed this logic and declined to hold the
departure of the res from the district court necessarily mooted the
case. 20 4 Rather, departure would moot the case only if further proceedings would essentially be useless.20 ' The plaintiff, World Wide Supply
OU, upon reversal of the decision, could obtain a judgment and then
attempt to enforce it against the debtor in another forum where funds
or the defendant could be located. 206 This potential outcome was
sufficient such that an appeal would not be an exercise in futility.

199. 802 F.3d 1255 (11th Cir. 2015).
200. Id. at 1257.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 1259.
203. Id. at 1260. "Other circuits have applied this holding to Rule B attachments,
determining that the departure of the attached res does not destroy jurisdiction." Id.; see
FED. R. Civ. P. Supp. B.

204. World Wide Supply OU, 802 F.3d at 1260.
205.

Id. at 1261.

206. Id.
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With respect to the underlying vacation of the Rule B attachment,"'
the court noted that the property (funds) being held by the law firm was
not the property of the debtor; rather, it was being held in trust for the
recipients of the settlement funds. 20 s Accordingly, the prerequisites for
the use of Rule B were not met in the first instance.20 9
C.

A/S Dan-BunkeringLtd. v. M/V CENTRANS DEMETER

'

In A/S Dan-BunkeringLtd. v. M/V CENTRANS DEMETER,2 10 MN
CENTRANS DEMETER is a seagoing vessel owned by Aries Shipping
Co. (Aries). Aries entered into a voyage charter with Zhenhua International Shipping Co. (Zhenhua) for a single voyage of the M/V CENTRANS DEMETER. Bunkers were ordered from and delivered to the
ship by the plaintiff, A/S Dan-Bunkering Ltd (Dan-Bunkering). Anyone
who is familiar with the vagaries of international bunker sales knows
how the story ends: Dan-Bunkering was not paid, and the company
arrested the vessel when it arrived in the Port of Mobile, Alabama.2 1
Dan-Bunkering argued the terms and conditions of its sales contract
with Zhenhua allowed it to seek a maritime lien under U.S. law. Aries
moved to vacate the arrest and dismiss the suit; in response, DanBunkering moved for summary judgment on its lien claim. The district
court ultimately dismissed the action under the doctrine of forum non
conveniens, with the condition that Aries submit itself to the jurisdiction
of a Hong Kong court.2 1 2 On appeal, Dan-Bunkering did not challenge
the application of Hong Kong law to the issue of contract formation, but
rather challenged the forum non conveniens dismissal made after the
choice of law determination.2 1 3
The bunkering contract entered between Dan-Bunkering and Zhenhua
called for application of Danish law.2 14 However, it went on to provide
that the seller was entitled to rely on other legal regimes, including the
right to:
[E]njoy full benefit of local rules granting the Seller maritime lien in
the vessel and/or providing for the right to arrest the vessel. Nothing

207. FED. R. CIv. P. Supp. B.
208. World Wide Supply OU, 802 F.3d at 1263.
209. Id.; see also FED. R. CIV. P. Supp. B(1)(a) (requiring that property of the absent
defendant be found within the district for purposes of garnishment under Rule B).
210. No. 15-11541, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 21449, at *1 (11th Cir. Dec. 11, 2015).
211. Id. at *1-2.
212. Id. at *4-6. The ship was a Hong Kong-flagged vessel, and the bunkers were
delivered while the ship was in the Port of Hong Kong. Id. at *6-7, *11.
213. Id. at *2.
214. Id. at *4-5, *4 n.2.
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in this Bunker Contract shall be construed to limit the rights or legal
remedies that the Seller may enjoy against the Vessel or Buyer in any
jurisdiction."'

To dismiss a suit based on the doctrine of forum non conveniens, the
following factors must be demonstrated: (1) an adequate alternative
forum; and (2) the private and public interest factors collectively weigh
in favor of dismissal.2 1 6 The need to resolve and apply foreign law
generally supports dismissal. 2 17 To avoid prejudice to the plaintiff, the
district court can attach conditions (i.e., consent to jurisdiction in Hong

Kong) to which the defendant must submit before suit can be dismissed.2 1 8

The court determined Hong Kong was an adequate forum in which to
resolve the dispute, rejecting Dan-Bunkering's position it might not be
able to secure its claim by use of a maritime lien and in rem claim
against the ship.2 19 Turning to the public and private factors, the
Eleventh Circuit likewise determined these weighed in favor of dismissal
based on forum non conveniens.220 Relevant private factors included
the availability of evidence, access to witnesses, ability to view the
premises, "and all other practical problems that make trial of a case
easy, expeditious and inexpensive."22 1

The public factors included

court congestion, having a controversy decided by local court, and
application of foreign law.2 2 2 At the end of the day, the district court's
dismissal based on forum non conveniens was affirmed.2 2 3
Frankly, this outcome poses problems for vendors seeking to enforce
contractual provisions which permit use of local law to secure claims and

enforce lien rights. The Eleventh Circuit ignored one of the fundamental
principles underlying in rem process: the need to obtain security and

payment for maritime debts in the face of the realities of global
commerce (i.e., vessels leave jurisdictions and never return, owners are

often difficult to locate, and expenses of enforcing foreign judgments).
Further, this decision seems contrary to precedent on the topic. For
example, in Liverpool & London S.S. Protection& Indemnity Ass'n v. MV

QUEEN OF LEMAN, 22 4 the United States Court of Appeals for Fifth

215.

Id. at *4 n.2.

216.
217.
218.
219.

Id. at *8.
Id.
Id. at *9.
Id. at *10.

220.
221.
222.
223.
224.

Id.
Id. (quoting Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508 (1947)).
Id.
Id. at *12.
296 F.3d 350 (5th Cir. 2002).
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Circuit upheld a maritime lien asserted by an English underwriter
against a vessel for unpaid insurance premiums.22 5 The insurance
contract at issue provided for application of English law, but also
allowed the insurer to "enforce its right of lien in any jurisdiction in
accordance with local law in such jurisdiction. 226 The Fifth Circuit
held the underwriter was entitled to seek a maritime lien under U.S. law
by filing suit in Louisiana, concluding "there is nothing absurd about
applying the law of the jurisdiction to which the ship sails, as the ship's
presence in the jurisdiction represents a substantial contact." 227

VIII. LHWCA CLAIMS
Horton v. Maersk Line, Ltd.22 8 is a longshoreman's lawsuit against
Maersk Line, Ltd. (Maersk), the owner of the M/V SEALAND CHAMPION, and A.P. Moller-Maersk, A/S (Moller), the owner of a shipping
container loaded aboard the SEALAND CHAMPION. While performing
stevedoring services aboard the vessel, Plaintiff John Horton was struck
in the head by a falling twist lock 2 2 9 which had become dislodged from
a shipping container. Horton sustained a broken neck. Horton sued
both Maersk (vessel owner) and Moller (shipping container owner), but
the district court granted summary judgment for both defendants. With
respect to the container owner (Moller), the court first excluded the
plaintiff's expert witnesses and then determined there was no genuine
issue of material fact precluding summary judgment on liability.2 3 0
With respect to Maersk, the court found the plaintiff failed to demonstrate any violation of the fairly narrow duties imposed upon a vessel
owner vis-a-vis longshoremen performing work aboard ship.231
This case is important because it rebuffs efforts to expand the
narrowly-cabined obligations a ship owner owes to longshoremen
working aboard a vessel.2 3 2 The plaintiff argued the International

225. Id. at 355.
226. Id. at 353.
227. Id. at 354; accord World Fuel Servs. Singapore, PTE v. BULK JULIANA M/V, No.
13-5421, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16829, at *1, *13 (E.D. La. Feb. 11, 2015).
228. 603 F. App'x 791 (11th Cir. 2015).
229. "A twist lock is a locking device for securing large containers to the trailers on
which they are transported." Id. at 793 n.1.
230. Id. at 793, 794.
231. Id. at 795. See, e.g., Scindia Steam Navigation Co. v. De Los Santos, 451 U.S. 156,
166-67 (1981) (outlining duties shipowner owes to longshoremen working aboard the
vessel).
232. 33 U.S.C. § 905(b) (2012) (providing in pertinent part that "[iln the event of injury
to a person covered under this chapter caused by the negligence of a vessel, then such
person, or anyone otherwise entitled to recover damages by reason thereof, may bring an
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Safety Management Code (ISM Code) 23 3-which vessels and their crew
are obligated to follow as part of the International Convention for Safety
of Life at Sea (SOLAS)-imposed duties upon a vessel owner vis-a-vis
longshoreman.
Specifically, the ISM Code Manual on the SEALAND
CHAMPION required the ship's officers to supervise and ensure safe
cargo operations.23 5
The Eleventh Circuit appears to be the first circuit to address the
issue of whether the ISM Code imposed duties running from the vessel
to longshoremen besides those enumerated in the Longshore and Harbor
Workers' Compensation Act (LHWCA) 236 and its interpretive jurisprudence. 237 The appellate court rejected this position, as it found no
authority which recognized the Code as modifying the duties set out in
the LHWCA and recognized in Scindia." 8 Additionally, the Eleventh
Circuit was reluctant to impose duties to supervise cargo loading
operations upon the vessel owner which ran "contrary to the Supreme
Court's interpretation of the [LHWCA]: namely, that a duty to supervise
the stevedore would 'saddle the shipowner with precisely the sort of
nondelegable duty that Congress sought to eliminate[.]"'2 3 9
IX.

CRIMINAL LAW-FAILURE TO "HEAVE To"

The decision in United States v. Rodriguez,24 0 seemed unique, in that
rarely do we see a prosecution for failure to "heave to" upon order of a
maritime law enforcement official (at least in the Author's practice).
Antonio Rodriguez appealed his conviction for the knowing failure to
obey a law enforcement official's order to "heave to." In September 2013,
a Customs and Boarder Protection airplane spotted two jet skis without
navigation lights approximately thirty nautical miles off the coast of
Florida. The jet skis were not moving, so the personnel aboard the
airplane presumed them to be in distress and called the United States
Coast Guard (USCG). A Coast Guard cutter was deployed, but the jet

action against such vessel as a third party.").
233. See International Management Code for the Safe Operation of Ships and for
Pollution Prevention (InternationalSafety Management (ISM) Code), reprinted in 6D
BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY, Doc. 14-2 (2015).
234. Horton, 603 F. App'x at 795. The United States expressly adopted the provisions
of the ISM Code and charged the U.S. Coast Guard with enforcement of same. See U.S.C.
§§ 3201-3205 (2012) and regulations adopted at 33 C.F.R. §§ 96.200-96.390 (2015).
235. Horton, 603 F. App'x at 795.
236. 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950 (2012).
237. Horton, 603 F. App'x at 795-97.
238. Id. at 797.
239. Id. (second brackets in original) (quoting Scindia, 451 U.S. at 169).
240. 596 F. App'x 753 (11th Cir. 2014).
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skis began to move away from the USCG vessel upon its approach even
after the cutter activated its blue lights. A small boat was deployed, but
the jet skis continued their evasive maneuvers. The USCG officers in
the smaller vessel hailed the jet ski operators, repeatedly advising them
to stop in both English and Spanish."
After three to five minutes of pursuit, the jet skis stopped. The riders
explained their actions were based on fear that the Coast Guard was
actually the Cuban military, which had purportedly fired on these jet
skis earlier in the evening. The duo also explained they were trying to
go camping, but there was no camping equipment aboard the jet skis.
There was also the explanation of lobster fishing, although no such
equipment was found for this endeavor, either.24 2
Eventually, the jet ski riders were arrested and charged with violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 2237(a)(1), 24 3 which provides in pertinent part that an
offence is punishable by law when:

.

[tihe master, operator, or person in charge of a vessel of the United
States, or a vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United States,. .
knowingly fail[s] to obey an order by an authorized Federal law
enforcement officer to heave to that vessel.

The jury convicted Rodriguez of violating 18 U.S.C. § 2237(a)(1), and
he appealed the decision based on the sufficiency of the evidence.24
Given the fairly deferential standard of review-all evidence considered
in the light most favorable to the government and all reasonable
inferences and credibility of the evaluations in favor of jury's verdict-the Eleventh Circuit did not expend too much effort to affirm the
conviction and sixteen-month sentence imposed on Rodriguez."
X.

MARITIME TORTS

In Middleton v. MIV GLORY SKY I,247 the Eleventh Circuit dealt
with the tort of conversion in the marine context. David Middleton
stored a large quantity of black beans in a warehouse owned and
operated by Emile Destin. Eventually, Destin absconded with 3800 bags
of the beans, loading them aboard the M/V GLORY SKY I, a ship Destin
operated, for transport to Haiti. Learning of the unauthorized removal

241. Id. at 754-55.
242. Id. at 755.
243. 18 U.S.C. § 2237(a)(1) (2012).
244. Rodriguez, 596 F. App'x at 755 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2237(a)(1)).
245. Id.
246. Id. at 755, 756-57.
247. 567 F. App'x 811 (11th Cir. 2014).

ADMIRALTY

2 0161]

8 17

of the beans, Middleton met Destin aboard the M/V GLORY SKY I and
demanded return of his legumes. Destin refused, and the ship sailed to
Haiti where the beans were sold without compensation to Middleton.
Middleton eventually obtained a judgment in state court against Destin
and his operating company.' A federal action was then filed seeking
arrest of the M/V GLORY SKY I pursuant to Rule C of the Supplemental
Rules for Admiralty or Maritime Claims.2 4 9 The district court dismissed the suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, finding no
maritime tort had occurred.2 0
On appeal, Middleton argued the tort of conversion had a sufficient
nexus with maritime commerce: recall that a party seeking to invoke
federal admiralty jurisdiction for a tort claim has to satisfy conditions of
location and connection with maritime activity.251' The location inquiry
asks whether the tort occurred on navigable water.252 This was the
dispositive issue on appeal. The Eleventh Circuit held the conversion
was complete when the beans were removed from the warehouse without
permission.2 5 3 The appellate court rejected the argument that Middleton's attendance on board the vessel and the subsequent refusal to
return the beans constituted a "new" conversion.254
There was an argument advanced for the first time on appeal that the
loading of the beans onto the vessel constituted an independent
"maritime" conversion.2 55
There was no authority cited for this
proposition, however, and the court rejected the idea the vessel-as a
separate legal entity under maritime law-could "re-appropriate the
beans for its own purposes and thereby commit a new conversion
separate from Destin's."256 No new maritime conversion, therefore,
occurred when the beans were loaded onto the MN GLORY SKY I.257

248.
249.
250.
251.

Id. at 812-13.
FED. R. CIv. P. Supp. C.
Middleton, 567 F. App'x at 812-13.
Id. at 813.

252. Id.
253.
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Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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